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INTRODUCTION 
This brief is in reply to the brief of the State of Utah. The 
State's brief essentially concedes that Appellant did not receive 
conflict free representation and that her representation violated 
the precepts set forth in State v. Brown. Despite the State's 
arguments to the contrary, a ruling from this Court regarding the 
proper parameters and application of Brown is critical to future 
cases of this nature. Moreover, Appellant's counsel is entitled to 
his fees in pursuing Appellant's interests. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Because the State has conceded that Wright's 
representation of Swanson amounted to a violation of State v. Brown 
in this case, it is unnecessary to reiterate the arguments on that 
issue. Therefore, Amicus will rest on the arguments set forth on 
this issue in both its brief and the Brief of the Appellant. 
II. Even though the state has conceded that a Brown violation 
occurred here, this Court should still address the issue and 
provide much needed guidance in the conflicts of interest area. 
Alternatively, if this Court feels that the issue raised by the 
briefs are beyond the Court's jurisdiction, it should certify this 
case to the Supreme Court for consideration. 
III. Because Mr. Huntsman provided representation to Swanson 
which Washington County had a duty to provide but failed to 
provide, Mr. Huntsman is entitled to attorney's fees in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE REPRESENTATION OF SWANSON WAS TAINTED BY A 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN VIOLATION OF STATE V. BROWN. 
SWANSON'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE VACATED AND HER CASE 
REMANDED. 
At the outset of its brief, the State correctly concedes that 
J. MacArthur Wright's representation of Swanson as appointed 
counsel "ran afoul" of the principles announced by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). (Br. State, p. 
16) . The State further concedes that the appropriate remedy for 
this violation is reversal of Swanson's conviction and remand for 
a new trial. However, Appellant while agreeing there was error 
below, disagrees that the appropriate remedy should be limited to 
reversal and remand. Appellant requests this Court to dismiss her 
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conviction outright or in the alternative, allow her to withdraw 
her plea or, if she chooses, accept the entry of plea previously 
given and the sentence of the trial court. Id. Because the State 
concedes error below, Amicus will forego further discussion of the 
merits of this issue and adopt the arguments on this point as set 
forth in both its brief and the Brief of Appellant. (See Br. 
Amicus, pp. 4-15, Br. App., pp. 29-37). 
II. THIS COURT, OR ALTERNATIVELY THE SUPREME COURT. CAN AND 
SHOULD ADDRESS THE REPRESENTATION ISSUES IN THIS CASE 
THEREBY GIVING FURTHER GUIDANCE AS TO THE CORRECT 
INTERPRETATION OF BROWN. 
Although never explicitly argued, the State appears to imply 
that the Brown issues raised by Appellant need not be addressed by 
this Court because the State has conceded the point. Instead, the 
State would apparently prefer to see cities and counties in Utah 
continue an unguided struggle with conflict of interest issues. 
The State further argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction "to 
promulgate a general order governing attorney conflicts of 
interest". (Br. State, p. 22). As discussed further below, this 
Court does have jurisdiction to apply and interpret the principles 
announced in Brown to the facts in this case and thereby give 
further guidance on conflict of interest issues. Alternatively, 
this Court could certify the case to the Supreme Court for that 
Court to address the issues raised in the briefs. 
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A. This Court has jurisdiction to interpret and apply 
Brown to the facts of this case, thereby providing 
further guidance on conflict of interest issues. 
The State would like to characterize Appellant's arguments as 
a request for a "general order" regarding the conduct of attorneys 
in conflict of interest areas. (Br. State., p. 22J.1 However, 
the Brief of Appellant and the Brief of Amicus Curiae argue, inter 
alia, that Wright's representation of Swanson violated the 
principles announced by the Supreme Court in Brown. (Br. App., pp. 
29-34; Br. Amicus, pp. 9-15). The proper interpretation of Brown 
and its application to the facts of this case are issues this Court 
can, and should, reach. 
The facts of this case alone establish that additional 
guidance as to the interpretation of Brown is needed by local 
cities and counties. In this case, both the Public Defender and 
the trial court found no conflict of interest in Wright's 
representation of Swanson. However, after an appeal was filed by 
Appellant's current counsel, the prosecutor offered to allow 
Swanson to withdraw her guilty plea if she would agree to withdraw 
her appeal. (Br. State, pp. 12-13 & 21 (citing R. 293)). 
1It is true that Appellant in her brief requests a "bright 
line" rule and includes a proposed "order" in section 4 of her 
argument. (Br. App., pp. 41-42). However, this is simply one 
alternative avenue of relief. Section 1 of Appellant's brief 
argues that Wright's representation of Swanson violated the 
principles announced in Brown and the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. (Br. App., pp. 29-34). 
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Furthermore, the State now concedes the issue on appeal. In other 
words, what was a clear violation of Brown to the State on appeal 
and to the prosecutor after an appeal had been filed was not so 
clear to the prosecutor while Swanson was represented by Wright or 
to the trial judge. This alone testifies to the confusion 
surrounding Brown and the need for further clarification and 
guidance from this Court.2 Simply ignoring Brown violations by 
conceding the point does nothing to cure ongoing violations or 
prevent future violations. 
B. Alternatively, this Court could certify the case to 
the Supreme Court for consideration of the issues 
raised. 
If this Court feels that the relief requested by Appellant is 
beyond the scope of its jurisdiction, this Court could certify the 
case to the Supreme Court as requested by Appellant. Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 43 provides that the Court of Appeals can 
certify a case for transfer to the Supreme Court either upon the 
request of a party or upon this Court's own motion. Utah R. App. 
P. 43. Such transfer is appropriate in a case where it is 
"apparent that the case should be decided by the Supreme Court and 
2The State's brief reveals another Brown violation, which may 
be ongoing. Apparently, John Hummel, another attorney with 
Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox, appeared as a prosecutor in the Ivins 
justice court while he "also serves as the public defender for the 
City of Kanab." (Br. State, p. 9 & p. 9 fn.2 (citing R. 145 & R. 
311)). This is just further evidence that the principles in Brown 
need to be reaffirmed and enforced. 
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that the Supreme Court would probably grant a petition for a writ 
of certiorari in the case if decided by the Court of Appeals, 
irrespective of how the Court of Appeals might rule . . . ." Id. 
If this Court decides that it does not have the jurisdiction to 
provide the relief requested by Appellant, then this case is an 
appropriate one for certification to the Supreme Court. 
III. BECAUSE WASHINGTON COUNTY FAILED TO MEET ITS 
RESPONSIBILITY OF PROVIDING SWANSON WITH COUNSEL WITH 
UNDIVIDED LOYALTY, THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO SWANSON'S CURRENT COUNSEL. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (1992), Washington County was 
required to supply Swanson with counsel with "undivided loyalty" 
both for the trial and for a first appeal of right. The State 
concedes that the County failed to meet this burden at the trial 
phase, thus requiring reversal of Appellant's conviction. (Br. 
State., p. 16) . However, the State "assails the basic fairness" of 
awarding attorney's fees to Swanson•s current counsel because the 
prosecutor offered to allow Swanson to withdraw her guilty plea if 
she would withdraw her appeal. This argument conveniently 
overlooks one very important fact: The prosecutor offered to allow 
Swanson to withdraw her guilty plea only after Swanson's current 
counsel had already assumed the case and filed a notice of appeal. 
Prior to that time, while Swanson was still represented by Wright, 
neither the trial judge nor the prosecutor saw any conflict of 
interest which would warrant the appointment of new counsel or the 
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reversal of her conviction. In other words, the very fact the 
State tries to use to bar Mr. Huntsman from obtaining attorney's 
fees was brought about only because of Mr. Huntsman's intervention 
in Swanson's case. 
Additionally, Mr. Huntsman was stuck in a "Catch-22". Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-32-2 (1992) requires the trial judge to select and 
appoint an attorney in the event of a conflict of interest. 
Therefore, in order for someone other than an attorney contracting 
with the County to be appointed to Swanson's case, a conflict of 
interest had to be shown. Given the facts of this case, Swanson's 
appointed counsel could not challenge himself based on a conflict 
of interest, but Mr. Huntsman could not be appointed until a 
conflict had been shown. Therefore, the only way Mr. Huntsman 
could proceed was to do exactly what he did, namely assume the case 
and challenge Wright's representation. 
Furthermore, for the same reason Wright couldn't challenge 
himself for a conflict of interest at the trial level, neither 
could he pursue this appeal. Again, the only course of action for 
Mr. Huntsman was to pursue the appeal himself and challenge 
Wright's representation of Swanson. 
The State makes much of the fact that a non-contracting 
attorney can be appointed to case only after a hearing, notice to 
the county attorney and "findings that there is a compelling 
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reasons (sic) to appoint a noncontracting attorney", nor can 
compensation be given without the approval of the district court 
were the original trial was held. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32-2 and -
3; Br. State, pp. 19-20. Again, this is a Catch-22. The findings 
necessary to appoint a non-contracting attorney are the 
responsibility of the trial court as it is the responsibility of 
the trial court to approve fees. However, in this case, the trial 
judge never saw a conflict of interest, and therefore would not 
make the findings necessary to appoint someone other than Wright.3 
In fact, the only "basic fairness" which is assailable in this 
case is the fact that Wright, who "defended" Swanson in the face of 
a conflict so clear that both the prosecutor and the State on 
appeal concede it, and whose actions generated this appeal, is 
compensated for his services while Mr. Huntsman is not. Equity and 
"basic fairness" require that Mr. Huntsman be afforded compensation 
for his representation of Swanson in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the State has conceded that a Brown violation occurred 
in this case, the merits of that issue need not be reiterated. 
3In a footnote, the State argues that the because the trial 
court issued a certificate of probable cause, "it seems likely" 
that it would have granted a motion for appointment of counsel tc 
handle the conflicts issue on appeal. (Br. State, p. 21 fn.6). 
However, the prosecutor had already offered to stipulate to the 
issuance of the certificate of probable cause. (Br. State., p. 13 
fn.3 (citing R. 293)). 
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However, regardless of the State's concession, this Court should 
address the issue thereby providing further clarification and 
instruction on conflict of interest issues. Alternatively, if this 
Court feels that the issue is beyond the scope of its jurisdiction, 
it can certify the case to the Supreme Court for consideration. 
Finally, because Mr. Huntsman provided services to Swanson where 
Washington County had a duty to do so but breached that duty, Mr. 
Huntsman is entitled to attorney's fees in this case. 
DATED this *f ** day of May, 1994. 
KATHftYN DXjCENDELL 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
UTAH FOUNDATION, INC. 
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